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ESSAY
“ELECTORAL INTEGRITY,” “DEPENDENCE CORRUPTION,” AND WHAT’S
NEW UNDER THE SUN
RICHARD L. HASEN *
“What has been is what will be, and what has been done is what will be done, and
there is nothing new under the sun.” –Ecclesiastes 1:9
Justice Breyer’s dissent in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 1
the Supreme Court case striking down some federal contribution limits and
making it harder to uphold others, valiantly offers a variety of theories supporting
the constitutionality of campaign finance limits. Especially intriguing was Justice
Breyer’s citation to Dean Robert Post’s “electoral integrity” argument from his
Citizens Divided book based on Post’s Tanner lectures. 2
Justice Breyer’s citation to Dean Post’s argument was so intriguing
because the book was not yet publicly available. 3 How Justice Breyer got a copy
to cite has not been revealed, 4 but it made me all the more curious to see what
Dean Post had come up with to justify Justice Breyer’s deviation from the
Justices’ ordinary practice of citing only publicly available materials or making
available in the Clerk of Court’s file any materials that are not easily available.
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Alas, as Professor Justin Levitt’s exceptionally polite but trenchant
critique of Dean Post’s “electoral integrity” argument convincingly demonstrates, 5
Dean Post’s “electoral integrity” argument is simply a variation on a theme which
has been around since at least the 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo: a public
confidence argument for campaign finance limitations. In Buckley, the Court
couched this interest as an “appearance of corruption” argument: “Congress could
legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence
is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative Government is not
to be eroded to a disastrous extent.” 6 The Court in McCutcheon explicitly held
that the appearance of corruption interest could not justify the aggregate
contribution limits challenged in the case (and in so doing it appeared to narrow
the scope of the appearance of corruption argument). 7
What’s worse, as both Professor Levitt 8 and Professor Pam Karlan (in her
response to Dean Post in the Citizens Divided book 9) amply demonstrate, social
science has not found a convincing link between public confidence and the state
of campaign finance laws. That is, while the public likes campaign finance limits
and while it has a low opinion of Congress, the two views are not necessarily
causally related: Stricter campaign finance laws are not correlated with higher
public confidence in government. 10
That is not to say that there could never be a link. Dean Post may be wrong
empirically today but right in predicting the future: It might be that public
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confidence in government will decline further because of the explosion of outside
money wrought by the Roberts Court’s campaign finance cases.
Dean Post is one of the sharpest constitutional minds in the country. His
book is beautifully written and tells a compelling historical tale of campaigns and
speech in the United States. So why would he offer in the prestigious Tanner
Lectures as his grand solution to the campaign finance problem a government
interest justifying reform that the Court has already rejected and that is largely
unsupported by social science evidence? And why would Justice Breyer so
eagerly latch on to this interest, viewing it as important enough to cite before
Dean Post’s book was even available?
My sense is that Dean Post was looking to offer a different label or
doctrinal hook to allow the Court (or more likely, a progressive Court, which
could well come after the Roberts Court) to reverse the Citizens United line of
cases consistent with an appearance of fidelity to First Amendment doctrine. 11
Upholding a “new” interest in “electoral integrity” would not require the Court to
outright reject the reasoning in earlier cases, making it perhaps more palatable for
a Court that would not want to be criticized (as the Roberts Court sometimes is 12)
for overruling precedent.
I see a parallel approach to campaign finance reform offered by Professor
Lawrence Lessig of Harvard. Like Dean Post, Professor Lessig has one of the
sharpest constitutional minds in the country. Like Dean Post, Professor Lessig has
offered what he claims is a novel constitutional theory to justify campaign finance
limits: “dependence corruption.” And like Dean Post, Professor Lessig appears to
have repackaged an old interest under a new label. In Professor Lessig’s case, the
“dependence corruption” interest is one in promoting political equality, an interest
the Supreme Court has repeatedly (and in my view) wrongly rejected since the
Buckley case. Professor Lessig denies the two interests are the same, even though
Dean Post, I, and others have pressed the point. 13 His audience, at least at first,
11
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seemed not a future progressive Supreme Court majority but a conservative
Justice interested in originalism—Professor Lessig has spent much time trying to
show that “dependence corruption” was a concern of the Founders. In
McCutcheon, however, the Court ignored the originalist arguments Professor
Lessig put forward in an amicus brief. 14
When it comes down to it, there are really only three major arguments
which have been advanced in the last 40 years to justify limits on money in
politics against a charge that such limits violate First Amendment rights of speech
and association: an anti-corruption interest, a political equality interest, and a
public confidence interest. To be sure, there has been great fighting over what
“corruption” means, and as Professor Levitt shows, 15 the Supreme Court majority
has simply closed off the presentation of evidence of corruption to justify
campaign finance limits. Further, there are a variety of types of corruption,
political equality, and public confidence arguments. But it is really just these three
interests debated by the Court and commentators: nothing new under the sun. 16
It may well be that if and when the Supreme Court reverses Citizens
United and the rest of its deregulatory jurisprudence, the Justices will latch onto
something like “electoral integrity” or “dependence corruption” to explain the
latest reversal. Maybe even some Justices will actually believe that these interests
represent new arguments not before considered by the Court. But it would be far
better from the point of view of coherent doctrine and sound policy for the Court
to transparently and forthrightly relate these new arguments to the old, and to
explain where the Court went wrong before and what path it should take going
forward.
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